Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation
从政治经济学角度重新审视经济学家对激励规制的偏好，用不完全契约方法分析环境政策工具选择，论证宪法约束虽看似低效但能限制政客分配租金，从而解释激励机制的兴起。
This article makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preference for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. We recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism design literature within an incomplete contract approach to political economy. We show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a standard economic viewpoint. Their justification lies in the limitations they impose on the politicians' ability to distribute rents. Insights are provided on the emergence of incentive mechanisms in environmental regulation.