Screening, Market Signalling, and Capital Structure Theory
构建了一个均衡模型，通过结合信号传递和成本筛选机制，解决产品质量信息不对称问题，并应用于资本市场，分析债券持有人如何利用信息影响企业债务权益比和债务期限结构的选择。
This paper develops an equilibrium model in which informational asymmetries about the qualities of products offered for sale are resolved through a mechanism which combines the signalling and costly screening approaches. The model is developed in the context of a capital market setting in which bondholders produce costly information about a firm's a priori imperfectly known earnings distribution and use this information in specifying a bond valuation schedule to the firm. Given this schedule, the firm's optimal choices of debt-equity ratio and debt maturity structure subsequently signal to prospective shareholders the relevant parameters of the firm's earnings distribution.