Investment Decisions, Financial Flows, and Self‐Enforcing Contracts*
研究以实物抵押担保的动态信贷关系中风险分担的作用，发现当借贷双方无法承诺不终止关系时，过度投资是最优的，它有助于平滑生产并实现风险分担。
This article studies the role of risk sharing in dynamic credit relationships that are secured by physical collateral. It is shown that, when borrowers and lenders cannot commit not to terminate relationships (through default in the first case and liquidation in the second), overinvestment is optimal. Overinvestment facilitates risk sharing in this context: It occurs in expectation of periods in which lenders are unwilling to supply all the funds necessary to achieve complete risk sharing. Typically, overinvestment happens when investment decreases; it slows down the pace at which the capital stock is reduced and therefore results in production smoothing.