An Adverse-Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy
构建了一个基于信息问题的银行资产负债管理模型，解释货币政策如何通过影响银行融资约束来传导，既为银行贷款渠道提供了微观基础，也揭示了货币政策影响债券市场利率的新机制。
This paper develops a model of bank asset and liability management, based on the idea that information problems make it difficult for banks to raise funds with instruments other than insured deposits. The model can be used to address the question of how monetary policy works. One effect it captures is that when the Fed reduces reserves, this tightens banks' financing constraints and thereby leads to a cutback in bank lending -- this is the 'bank lending channel' in action. However, in addition to providing a specific set of microfoundations for the lending channel, the model also yields a novel account of how monetary policy affects bond-market interest rates.