Commercial banks in investment banking conflict of interest or certification role?
研究商业银行同时放贷和承销证券时，其认证角色是增强还是削弱。通过分析美国《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》前银行与投资银行承销证券的定价差异，发现投资者愿为银行承销的证券支付更高价格，支持银行的认证角色，尤其对次级和信息敏感证券更有价值。
When commercial banks make loans to firms and also underwrite securities, does this hamper or enhance their role as certifiers of firm value? This paper examines empirically the pricing of bank-underwritten securities as compared to investment-house-underwritten securities over a unique period in the U.S. (pre-Glass-Steagall) when both banks and investment houses were allowed to underwrite securities. The evidence shows that investors were willing to pay higher prices for securities underwritten by banks rather than investment houses. The results support a certification role for banks, which is more valuable for junior and information sensitive securities.