Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions
证明保留价格可用于控制未观测的拍卖品异质性，从而识别和估计竞拍者价值分布，并利用二手车拍卖平台数据表明该平台帮助卖家获取了大部分潜在价值。
This article shows how reserve prices can be used to control for unobserved object heterogeneity to identify and estimate the distribution of bidder values in auctions. Reserve prices are assumed to be monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity, but not necessarily set optimally. The model is estimated using transaction prices from a used car auction platform to show that the platform enables sellers to capture a large fraction of the potential value from selling their vehicle. Individual sellers benefit mostly from access to a large set of buyers, but the magnitude depends on accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.