Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell Telephone Company, 1894-1912
以南方贝尔电话公司为例，提出修正的捕食假说，解释其如何通过低于成本的定价、提前投资长途线路、影响监管政策等手段消除竞争，最终实现本地电话服务的自然垄断。
Focusing on the Southern Bell Telephone Company, the authors propose a modified version of the predation hypothesis to explain Bell's 'natural' monopoly over local telephone service. Southern Bell effectively eliminated competition through a strategy of pricing below cost in response to entry, which deprived competitors of the cash flow required for expansion even if it failed to induce exit; investing in toll lines ahead of demand, isolating independent companies in smaller towns and rural areas, and forcing them to consolidate on favorable terms; and influencing local regulatory policy in larger cities to weaken rivals and ultimately to institutionalize the Bell monopoly. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.