Communication and Coordination in Social Networks
构建了一个协调博弈模型，研究人们如何通过沟通网络传递参与意愿，发现网络通过告知各阶段信息和创造共同知识来促进协调，并举例说明低维网络可能优于高维网络，以及“叛乱者”的分散程度对协调有双重影响。
I model people in a coordination game who use a communication network to tell each other their willingness to participate. The minimal sufficient networks for coordination can be interpreted as placing people into a hierarchy of social roles or "stages": "initial adopters", then "followers", and so on down to "late adopters". A communication network helps coordination in exactly two ways: by informing each stage about earlier stages, and by creating common knowledge within each stage. We then consider two examples: first we show that "low dimensional" networks can be better for coordination even though they have far fewer links than "high dimensional" networks; second we show that wide dispersion of "insurgents", people predisposed toward participation, can be good for coordination but too much dispersion can be bad.