Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search
研究红绿两类工人（标签不影响收益）的市场，发现存在对称均衡（颜色无关）和不对称均衡（企业只搜寻绿工人，导致绿工人更多获得技能、工资更高，红工人失业率更高），解释了同质个体间的内生歧视。
We consider a market with “red” and “green” workers, where labels are payoff irrelevant. Workers may acquire skills. Skilled workers search for vacancies, while firms search for workers. A unique symmetric equilibrium exists in which color is irrelevant. There are also asymmetric equilibria in which firms search only for green workers, more green than red workers acquire skills, skilled green workers receive higher wages, and the unemployment rate is higher among skilled red workers. Discrimination between ex ante identical individuals arises in equilibrium, and yet firms have perfect information about their workers, and strictly prefer to hire minority workers.