Does incentive compensation lower executives' willingness to take risks?
研究首次公开募股（IPO）公司的风险暴露与高管薪酬，发现战略风险高的公司高管更不愿接受股票期权等非现金激励，并探讨了独立董事和风险投资等替代治理机制。
The article reports on a study by Randolph P. Beatty and Edward J. Zajac concerning initial public offerings (IPO), risk exposure, and executive compensation. The researchers found that executives at firms that are strategically risky were less likely to accept non-cash incentives such as stock options because of the risk associated with holding the corporation's stock. Alternative governance mechanisms are used to monitor top management including independent directors on the corporate board and venture capital backing. An amendment to the United States Internal Revenue Code Section 162m is criticized for its potential to inhibit entrepreneurship.