Optimal Design of the Online Auction Channel: Analytical, Empirical, and Computational Insights*
研究了B2C在线拍卖（如Yankee拍卖）的收益生成过程，通过分析模型、实证和模拟验证，设计了竞拍者估价空间的分区方案，帮助拍卖商优化关键控制因素（如竞价增量）以最大化收益。
ABSTRACT The focus of this study is on business‐to‐consumer (B2C) online auctions made possible by the advent of electronic commerce over an open‐source, ubiquitous Internet Protocol (IP) computer network. This work presents an analytical model that characterizes the revenue generation process for a popular B2C online auction, namely, Yankee auctions. Such auctions sell multiple identical units of a good to multiple buyers using an ascending and open auction mechanism. The methodologies used to validate the analytical model range from empirical analysis to simulation. A key contribution of this study is the design of a partitioning scheme of the discrete valuation space of the bidders such that equilibrium points with higher revenue structures become identifiable and feasible. Our analysis indicates that the auctioneers are, most of the time, far away from the optimal choice of key control factors such as the bid increment, resulting in substantial losses in a market with already tight margins. With this in mind, we put forward a portfolio of tools, varying in their level of abstraction and information intensity requirements, which help auctioneers maximize their revenues.