Common agency with Rational Expectations: Theory and Application to a Monetary Union
扩展了共同代理理论，考虑委托人的收益受其对代理人事后选择的预期影响，并应用于货币联盟中成员国政府通过激励合同影响央行政策的情形，发现某些规则会导致过度通缩倾向。
We extend the theory of common agency to the situation where the principals’ payoffs are affected by their ex ante expectations of the agent's ex post choice. We show how the usual truthful schedules must be modified to account for the rational expectations constraint. We apply the model to a monetary union where member governments influence the policy of the common central bank using incentive contracts. We examine how the outcomes depend on different delegated objectives of the bank, and find that some often‐advocated rules create an excessive deflationary bias.