Optimal Commodity Promotion when Downstream Markets are Imperfectly Competitive
研究农产品加工和分销环节存在寡头或寡买势力时，如何最优地筹集和支出促销资金。模拟显示不完全竞争会降低农民最优广告支出，且营销部门可能攫取过半收益。
Abstract We investigate the optimal collection and expenditure of funds for agricultural commodity promotion in markets where the processing and distribution sectors may exhibit oligopoly and/or oligopsony power. The conditions that characterize optimal advertising intensity under perfect competition for funds generated from either per‐unit or lump‐sum taxes do not, in general, hold when marketing is imperfectly competitive. Simulation analyses show that imperfect competition always reduces farmers' optimal advertising expenditure and that an imperfectly competitive marketing sector may capture half or more of the benefits from the funds that are expended.