Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption
研究委托人将审计权委托给监督者后，监督者可能与代理人合谋隐瞒信息。模型表明，在有限跨期承诺下，腐败机会可能通过动态效应反而让委托人受益。
Corruption opportunities arise when a principal delegates enforcement or audit authority to a supervisor. The supervisor may then strike a deal with the agent she is supposed to monitor and conceal important information from the principal. Corruption imposes a constraint on governance and appears therefore to be harmful for the principal. We show that this need not be the case. In our model, the prospect of corruption can make the principal better off. The reason is that the collusion possibility generates dynamic effects which, in cases where only limited intertemporal commitments can be made, may be beneficial for the principal.