Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
结合政治网络数据、新型监控技术评估和舞弊直接测量，发现阿富汗2010年议会选举中存在有利于关系候选人的汇总舞弊，而监控技术公告使选举材料盗窃减少约60%，关系候选人得票减少约25%。
We investigate the relationship between political networks, weak institutions, and election fraud during the 2010 parliamentary election in Afghanistan combining: (i) data on political connections between candidates and election officials; (ii) a nationwide controlled evaluation of a novel monitoring technology; and (iii) direct measurements of aggregation fraud. We find considerable evidence of aggregation fraud in favor of connected candidates and that the announcement of a new monitoring technology reduced theft of election materials by about 60 percent and vote counts for connected candidates by about 25 percent. The results have implications for electoral competition and are potentially actionable for policymakers.