Corporate divestitures and family control
研究了家族企业剥离资产的行为与公司价值的关系，发现家族企业更少进行剥离，但一旦剥离，由家族CEO管理的企业业绩更好，表明家族企业可能因追求多重目标而未能充分利用经济机会。
This paper investigates the relationship between divestitures and firm value in family firms. Using hand‐collected data on a sample of over 30,000 firm‐year observations, we find that family firms are less likely than non‐family firms to undertake divestitures, especially when these companies are managed by family rather than non‐family‐ CEOs . However, we then establish that the divestitures undertaken by family firms, predominantly those run by family‐ CEOs , are associated with higher post‐divestiture performance than their non‐family counterparts. These findings indicate that family firms may fail to fully exploit available economic opportunities, potentially because they pursue multiple objectives beyond the maximization of shareholder value. These results also elucidate how the characteristics of corporate owners and managers can influence the value that firms derive from their corporate strategies . Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.