Repeated Transaction in Rural Grain Markets of Ethiopia
利用重复交易理论建模埃塞俄比亚农村谷物市场，分析信息获取、筛选成本和时间偏好如何驱动长期关系型交易，并基于2009年市场交易数据验证了信任通过高成本重复互动形成的观点。
Abstract This article uses the theory of repeated transaction to model exchange in rural grain markets. We examine the theoretical and empirical drivers of repeated transaction, as well as potential problems that may arise as a result of its widespread use. We develop a structural repeated game to represent buyer-seller relations in a developing country grain market, motivated by observations in Ethiopia. The model generates hypotheses regarding the logic that drives long-term tied transactions, as governed by information access, screening and investment costs, and time preferences. The model's predictions are tested using market transaction data collected in Ethiopia in 2009. Results support the view that a relational contract is driven by access to information and the costs of screening. Our major finding is that trust in relational trading can emerge through costly repeated interaction.