Elderly Care and Intrafamily Resource Allocation when Children Migrate
研究了国际迁移背景下，子女无法提供生活照料但能提供经济支持时，兄弟姐妹间如何分配对父母的照护责任，发现经济贡献是战略互补而时间贡献是战略替代。
This paper considers the intrafamily allocation of elderly care in the context of international migration where migrant children may be able to provide financial assistance to their parents, but are unable to offer physical care. To investigate the interaction between siblings, I take a non-cooperative view of family decision-making and estimate best response functions for individual physical and financial contributions as a function of siblings' contributions. I address the endogeneity of siblings' contributions and individual migration decisions by using siblings' characteristics as instrumental variables as well as models including family fixed effects. For both migrants and non-migrants, I find evidence that financial contributions function as strategic complements while siblings' time contributions operate as strategic substitutes. This suggests that children's contributions toward elderly care may be based on both strategic bequest and public good motivations.