The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation in South India
描述了南印度渠灌工程师如何通过水分配和合同获取大量非法收入，并向上级官员和政客分赃，指出以人事调动控制为核心的腐败体系是渠灌农业绩效低下的重要供给侧原因。
The paper describes how some irrigation engineers raise vast amounts of illicit revenue from the distribution of water and contracts, and redistribute part to superior officers and politicians. It argues that the corruption ‘system’, which is centred on control of personnel transfers, is an important supply‐side reason for poor performance of canal‐irrigated agriculture. Insofar as the same system operates in other government departments, it may be more important for understanding Indian politics and the political influences on economic development than has previously been realised.