Resolving a Conflict Situation with a Reference Outcome: An Axiomatic Model
构建了一个存在冲突结果和参考结果两种突出结果的冲突情境公理化模型，参考结果优于冲突结果但非帕累托最优，且所有谈判者同意解决方案应帕累托优于它。作者提出一个满足多个合意性质的唯一解函数，是纳什讨价还价问题的扩展，类似于Kalai-Smorodinsky解。
We formulate an axiomatic model of conflict situations in which there exist two prominent outcomes. One is the traditional conflict outcome, the other is the reference outcome. The latter is an outcome with the following properties: (1) It is Pareto-superior to the conflict outcome, (2) It is not Pareto optimal, (3) All the bargainers agree that the conflict's solution should be Pareto superior to it. We present a solution function for this model. It satisfies uniquely several desirable requirements. The model is an extension of Nash's Bargaining Problem paradigm, and the particular solution function we propose is a variation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.