Monitoring and Pay
指出效率工资的偷懒模型并不总是意味着监督与薪酬是替代关系；当监督成本下降时，最优努力水平可能上升，导致监督与薪酬同向变动，并预测工资与工人租金之间存在非单调关系。
The shirking model of efficiency wages has been thought to imply that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers. We demonstrate that this result is not generally true. As monitoring becomes cheaper, a given effort level will be implemented with more monitoring and less pay, but it is typically also optimal to implement a higher effort. The article provides conditions under which the latter "scale effect" dominates the former "substitution effect" and vice versa. If the ease of monitoring varies across occupations, the model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the wage level and workers' rents.