薪酬委员会的构成是否影响CEO薪酬实践?

Does the Composition of the Compensation Committee Influence CEO Compensation Practices?

Financial Management · 1999
被引 212 · 同刊同年前 2%
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究发现,当公司内部人员进入薪酬委员会时,CEO会在公司业绩不佳时获得更有利的薪酬与绩效关系,但薪酬总额并未显著提高。

Abstract

CEOs receive preferential treatment, at the expense of shareholders, when corporate insiders are included on the compensation committee. While CEO compensation is not greater, the relation between CEO compensation and corporate performance is more favorable to the CEO with insiders on the compensation committee when corporate performance is poor.

薪酬委员会构成CEO薪酬内部人控制薪酬绩效敏感性