Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate Illegality
分析了80家美国工业组织的数据，发现行业利润率低与严重环境违法频率高相关，且组织利润率、行业集中度等变量与严重违法存在统计交互，但与非严重违法无关，支持了动机、机会和选择交互作用的企业违法模型。
Research on corporate illegality spans several distinct literatures and defies ready integration. This article helps to overcome those problems. Analysis of data from 80 U.S. industrial organizations indicates that lower industry profitability is associated with higher frequencies of detected serious violations of federal environmental laws. Organizational profitability, industry concentration, organization size, structural complexity, organizational decentralization, and ethical climate join this variable in statistical interactions also associated with detected instances of serious environmental violations. However, none of those variables are found to be associated with the incidence of detected nonserious violations. These results provide qualified support for a model of corporate illegality in which illegal behaviors are attributable to the interactive effects of motive, opportunity, and choice. They suggest that illegal corporate activities resist simple explanation, and that future research on corporate illegality should concentrate on further development of multivariable models.