Nonmyopic Strategic Behavior in the MDP Planning Procedure
研究在公共品数量调整率低于预设阈值时终止的MDP规划程序中的非短视策略行为，证明该动态博弈存在完美纳什均衡，其结果是帕累托最优，且任何个体理性的帕累托最优均可通过某一均衡实现。
This paper addresses the question of nonmyopic strategic behavior in an MDP planning procedure which is terminated when the rate of adjustment in the quantity of the public good is below some prespecified threshold. The problem is formulated as a dynamic game in which utility functions are additively separable. It is shown that the game possesses perfect Nash equilibria whose outcomes are Pareto optima. Moreover, any individually rational Pareto optimum can be attained through one of these Nash equilibria. Strategies in these equilibria involve a rate of revision in the quantity of the public good that is equal to the threshold level and insures monotonic convergence of the procedure in finite time.