Market-share contracts as facilitating practices
研究了供应商根据零售商购买其产品份额给予折扣的合同（市场份额合同）如何影响市场竞争，发现这种合同能同时抑制品牌内和品牌间竞争，但会降低消费者剩余和社会福利。
This article investigates how the use of contracts that condition discounts on the share a supplier receives of a retailer's total purchases (market-share contracts) may affect market outcomes. The case of a dominant supplier that distributes its product through retailers that also sell substitute products is considered. It is found that when the supplier's contracts can only depend on how much a retailer purchases of its product (own-supplier contracts), intra- and interbrand competition cannot simultaneously be dampened. However, competition on all goods can simultaneously be dampened when market-share contracts are feasible. Compared to own-supplier contracts, the use of market-share contracts increases the dominant supplier's profit and, if demand is linear, lowers consumer surplus and welfare.