Middlemen in Bilateral Search Markets
研究就业中介、房产经纪等中间人在双边搜索市场中的作用，发现中间人使部分买卖双方退出搜索市场转而通过中间人交易，并降低搜索者的搜索强度；当搜索成本高且低效时中间人提升福利，反之则降低福利。
This article examines the role of middlemen in bilateral search markets (e.g., employment agencies, real estate brokers). It is shown that the middleman narrows the set of buyer (firm) and seller (worker) types who search; seller types with high valuations and buyer types with low valuations drop out of the search market and instead trade through the middleman. The middleman also decreases the equilibrium search intensities of those agents who search. It is proven that the middleman improves welfare if search is very costly and inefficient and decreases welfare if search is effectively costless and very efficient. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.