博弈中的思考、学习与教学模型

Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games

American Economic Review · 2003
被引 93
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

介绍三种行为模型:一次性博弈中的思考模型、随时间学习模型以及重复配对中的教学模型,旨在用认知细节更准确地解释实验证据并预测新规律。

Abstract

Noncooperative game theory combines strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency of beliefs and choices (equilibrium). Hundreds of experiments show that in actual behavior these three forces are limited, even when subjects are highly motivated and analytically skilled (Camerer, 2003). The challenge is to create models that are as general, precise, and parsimonious as equilibrium, but which also use cognitive details to explain experimental evidence more accurately and to predict new regularities. This paper describes three exemplar models of behavior in one-shot games (thinking), learning over time, and how repeated “partner” matching affects behavior (teaching) (see Camerer et al., 2002b).

非合作博弈认知层次模型经验加权吸引力学习伙伴匹配效应