Diversification Incentives under "Price-Based" and "Cost-Based" Regulation
分析了同时服务于垄断市场和竞争市场的企业面临的两种监管方案：成本监管（类似美国国内电话行业）和价格监管（对非竞争服务设价格上限，允许企业自由进入竞争市场），并比较了它们在成本虚报、技术选择、创新、定价和多元化决策上的激励差异。
This article considers two schemes of regulationforfirms that serve both monopoly markets and markets subjected to substantial competition. The first form (cost-based regulation) combines elements of rate-of-return regulation (on monopoly markets) with filly distributed cost pricing, much like the form of regulation currently in place in the domestic telephone industry. The secondform (price-based regulation) would establish rate caps on noncompetitive services, and allow the firm to enter into competitive markets and charge whatever prices it might like in those markets. Models of both forms of regulation are developed and analyzed with respect to incentives for cost misreporting, choice of technology, cost-reducing innovation, choices of prices and output levels, and diversification into competitive markets.