Does compensation for disruptions stimulate reforms? The case of agrarian reform in Central and Eastern Europe
研究了中东欧国家土地改革中，补偿措施能否激励集体农场管理者与工人接受改革，发现补偿必须与改革实施明确挂钩才有效，且结果取决于改革委员会的初始制度设计。
Most Central and Eastern European governments have decided to restore land to former owners, but there has been opposition to land reform from managers and workers of collective farms. This opposition has slowed down the reform because the local reform-implementing institutions (the ‘Reform Councils’) are heavily influenced by collective-farm interests. Governments have contemplated offering compensation to encourage acceptance of the reforms. This paper argues that compensation will not stimulate agrarian reform in CEECs unless it is explicitly linked to the implementation of the reforms. The paper discusses alternative options for changing the incentive structure of the Reform Councils, but concludes that results depend on the initial institutional design of the Reform Councils and the selection of their members.