AN ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT BARGAINING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
用博弈论分析农民与英国自然保护机构在信息不对称下就管理协议谈判的过程，发现农民利用信息优势可能造成低效结果，对依赖自愿协议保护特殊科学价值地点的做法提出质疑。
This paper provides a game theoretic analysis of Management Agreements under asymmetric information. A simple two‐period game is employed to represent the Coasian bargaining process which takes place between the farmer and English Nature over the introduction of a Management Agreement. The analysis shows that if the farmer possesses an information advantage and wishes to exploit it to gain an economic rent from the bargaining process, inefficient outcomes are possible. The implications of the analysis for the continued reliance upon voluntarism and Management Agreements for the protection of Sites of Special Scientific Interest are considered.