Inequality in the Local Public Sector
通过多辖区模型分析地方公共支出变化对租房者福利的影响，发现地方公共支出不平等反而有利于低收入居民，并指出外部援助可能适得其反。
Effects on renters' welfare of changes in local government spending are examined in a multijurisdiction model. In equilibrium each income class chooses the jurisdiction whose combination of local public output and housing price maximizes utility. Comparative-static analysis of this equilibrium is used to show how inequality in local public expenditure benefits low-income residents. If low-income residents are observed to choose jurisdictions with low levels of per capita public expenditure, then they may be worse off by outside aid which increases local public expenditure in their jurisdictions. The advantages of inequality in the local public sector also exist when a program of tax base equalization is introduced.