On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts
研究双边合约如何构成一种特殊机制，并定义合约均衡条件，证明在风险中性和独立私人信息下存在实现有效交易的合约均衡，且在偏好和技术条件满足时均衡唯一。
Bilateral contracts, while neither negotiated nor enforced in an integrated way, are nevertheless often interrelated both economically and strategically owing to production or consumption complementarities and to asymmetric information. A set of bilateral contracts forms a mechanism with special properties. This mechanism forms a contract equilibrium if there is no joint incentive for a supplier and any individual customer unilaterally to alter the terms of their contract. If agents' preferences are risk neutral in money income, and if their private information is independent, then there exists a contract equilibrium that implements efficient transactions. If, in addition, preferences are strictly concave and differentiable in goods and services, and technologically feasible sets are suitably convex, then this equilibrium is essentially unique.