Too Busy To Serve? An Examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors
研究了过度任职董事（同时在多个董事会任职）对公司并购决策的影响，发现他们能提供重要知识并提升并购绩效，是对内部董事和非过度任职外部董事的重要补充。
ABSTRACT Overboarded directors (i.e., those serving on too many boards) have come under recent attack. The accusation is that such directors are ‘stretched’ by several directorships and therefore cannot fulfil their governance responsibility. This study investigates the impact of overboarded directors upon key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Based on our examination of acquisition outcomes, we found that such directors are important sources of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, they represent an important complement to inside and non‐overboarded outside directors.