Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships
卖方对非耐用品重复定价，买方私知需求曲线位置，通过选择数量传递信息。论文刻画了首期完全分离的均衡，并发现即使立即分离，买方仍会持续扭曲行为，且信号要求可能提高所有知情方效用。
A seller of a nondurable good repeatedly faces a buyer who is privately informed about the position of his demand curve.The seller offers a price in each period.The buyer chooses a quantity given the price.The quantity demanded reveals information about the buyer.An equilibrium is characterized with the feature that buyer types separate completely in the first period.This equilibrium uniquely satisfies a modified refinement of the Cho-Kreps criterion.Despite the immediate separation, the buyer distorts his behavior throughout the game.The requirements to signal types can raise the utility of all types of informed players.