The Open-Loop von Stackelberg Equilibrium in the Cartel Versus Fringe Model: A Reply
讨论石油卡特尔面对竞争性边缘时，开环斯塔克尔伯格均衡的构建条件，指出当卡特尔在边缘之前和之后都供应时，价格路径可能不连续且出现向下跳跃，向上跳跃仅在低成本储存时可能，且均衡存在动态不一致性。
In some cases, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium for an oil cartel facing a competitive fringe can be constructed from simple principles, but these fail if the cartel supplies both before and after the fringe as reallocations between these two phases relocate the entire fringe price path. In such cases, the price path need not be continuous and downward jumps are possible and cannot be arbitraged away. Upward jumps can only be arbitraged if competitive agents can store oil at low cost. Such equilibria are dynamically inconsistent. Copyright 1992 by Royal Economic Society.