Repeated Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection and Limited Commitment
分析了一个两期垄断保险市场中的序贯均衡，考虑了信息不对称和有限承诺，描述了混同、半分离和分离均衡，并发现无折现时仅存在混同和半分离均衡，且事故相关保险和事故低报以正概率出现。
In this paper we describe the sequential equilibria of a two-period monopoly with asymmetric information and limited commitment in the market for accident insurance. The role of learning is analyzed; and the possible sequential pooling, semiseparating, and separating equilibria are described (where the probability that a buyer will make a revealing first-period contract choice is equal to zero, is positive, and is equal to one, respectively). In the absence of discounting, we show that only pooling and semiseparating equilibria exist; provide a limited characterization of when these equilibria occur; and show that accident-contingent insurance and accident underreporting occur with positive probability along the equilibrium path of the game.