The Household Bankruptcy Decision
利用PSID数据估计家庭破产决策模型，发现家庭更可能在财务收益高时申请破产，支持策略性破产理论，而非因不利事件无力偿还。
Personal bankruptcy filings have risen from 0.3 percent of households per year in 1984 to around 1.35 percent in 1998 and 1999, transforming bankruptcy from a rare occurrence to a routine event. Lenders lost about $39 billion in 1998 due to personal bankruptcy filings. But economists have little understanding of why households file for bankruptcy or why filings have increased so rapidly. Until very recently, studying the household bankruptcy decision was very difficult, because no household-level data set existed that included information on bankruptcy filings. In this paper, we use new data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which includes information on bankruptcy filings, to estimate a model of households’ bankruptcy decisions. We find support for the strategic model of bankruptcy, which predicts that households are more likely to file when their financial benefit from filing is higher. Our model predicts that an increase of $1,000 in households’ financial benefit from bankruptcy would result in a 7-percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings. Our model also predicts that if the 1997 National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s proposed changes in bankruptcy exemption levels were implemented, there would be a 16-percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings each year. But if the $100,000 cap on homestead exemptions recently passed by the U.S. Senate were adopted, our model predicts that there would be only a negligible effect on the number of filings. We find little support for the nonstrategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households file when adverse events occur which reduce their ability to repay. Finally, controlling for state and time fixed effects, our model shows that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they live in districts with higher aggregate filing rates.