Meetings with Costly Participation: An Empirical Analysis
利用美国大西洋中部蛤蜊和海洋圆蛤渔业数据，发现偏好极端政策的企业更可能参与决定法规的公开会议，且参与率与规模、距离和影响力正相关。
Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results: (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, "meetings with costly participation", (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in U.S. fisheries. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.