Choosing Constraints as a Third Solution to Agency*
论文提出激励合同和监督之外的第三种代理问题解决方案：约束选择，尤其适用于低频长期决策，并探讨了使命陈述作为嵌入约束的工具。
ABSTRACT The standard solutions to agency, incentive contracting and monitoring, are degraded by the frequency and the duration of the decisions affected. Decisions of low frequency and long duration are not effectively controlled by either monitoring or incentive contracting. For decisions of low frequency and long duration, constraining the firm's choices significantly reduces agency. Applying the theory, guidelines for choosing constraints are suggested, and propositions advanced. As one application, the mission statement is considered as a vehicle for embedding constraints. The theory is also investigated by examining existing recommendations for both the content and process of mission statements.