Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Income Sources
当家庭在收入水平和收入来源上存在差异时，最优执法政策会对容易监控的收入来源进行更严格的审计。该政策导致不同收入来源的申报行为差异很大，增加审计预算可能导致更多完全逃税者。
The optimal enforcement policy when households are heterogeneous, with respect to both income level and to income source, leads to more intense income auditing for easy-to-monitor sources. We obtain the common result that within each income source any taxpayer reporting less than a predetermined cut-off level will be audited, while taxpayers reporting at least this level will never be audited. However, this audit policy leads to very different reporting behavior depending on the income source. The Internal Revenue Service does not audit only honest taxpayers, and an increase in the audit budget may lead to a larger segment of full evaders.