Pricing Returned Check Charges under Asymmetric Information
研究银行在客户信息不完全的情况下如何通过菜单定价（包括退票费、最低余额要求、存款冻结期）来缓解逆向选择问题，导致竞争性银行可能故意对某些服务收费过高而对其他服务收费过低。
Consumer deposit pricing has recently been the subject of close public scrutiny. Banks have been accused of monopolistically setting fees for some of their deposit services at levels greater than associated costs. This paper examines consumer deposit pricing in a world characterized by imperfect information about a heterogeneous customer population. It is demonstrated that banks, in order to minimize an adverse selection problem, utilize a menu of pricing elements including NSF fees, minimum balance requirements, and deposit hold schedules. As a result, competitive banks may be deliberately overcharging for some component deposit services while simultaneously undercharging for others. Copyright 1986 by Ohio State University Press.