Unbalanced Information and the Interaction between Information Acquisition, Operating Activities, and Voluntary Disclosure
指出会计信息因无法同等精确地反映所有活动而存在固有失衡，这种失衡扭曲了经营活动，进而影响管理者获取信息和自愿披露的意愿。
As different activities cannot be measured or communicated with the same precision, accounting information is often only a partial and unbalanced reflection of the fundamental economics, emphasizing certain aspects of the underlying operations while disregarding others. We highlight this inherent imbalance in information as the source of an interaction between corporate operating and discretionary disclosure strategies, and thereby also as an important determinant of the information acquisition strategy. We demonstrate that information imbalance, via its distorting effect on operating activities, leads to a reduction in the propensity of managers to acquire information and provide voluntary disclosures.