Deterrence with Multiple Defendants: An Explanation for "Unfair" Plea Bargains
研究检察官面对多名被告时的辩诉交易策略，发现最优出价取决于被告被定罪的事前概率及其提高同伙定罪概率的能力，并解释了为何最应受罚的被告可能获得最低刑罚以最大化威慑。
This article examines plea bargaining where there are multiple defendants facing a prosecutor. The prosecutor's optimal offer to each defendant is shown to depend upon the following two factors: (i) the defendant's ex ante probability of conviction, and (ii) the defendant's ability to increase his co-conspirator's probability of conviction. Furthermore, if the ex ante probability of conviction is positively correlated with a defendant's ability to raise his co-conspirator's probability of conviction, a plea bargain that gives the most culpable defendant the lowest penalty can maximize deterrence.