Informed Lending and Security Design
研究贷款人在筛选项目后可能做出低效的接受或拒绝决策时，最优证券设计如何选择；债务适合过于保守的贷款人，杠杆股权适合过于激进的贷款人。
ABSTRACT We examine the role of security design when lenders make inefficient accept or reject decisions after screening projects. Lenders may be either “too conservative,” in which case they reject positive‐NPV projects, or “too aggressive,” in which case they accept negative‐NPV projects. In the first case, the uniquely optimal security is debt. In the second case, it is levered equity. In equilibrium, profitable projects that are relatively likely to break even are financed with debt, while less profitable projects are financed with equity. Highly profitable projects are financed by uninformed arm's‐length lenders.