Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments1
研究在私人信息下如何跨期分配人员到项目，发现风险中性与不完全契约倾向于长期分配，而轮岗能隐藏信息以缓解激励约束，完全契约下轮岗效果更佳。
This paper studies the assignment of people to projects over time in a model with private information. The combination of risk neutrality with incomplete contracts that restrict the ability of an agent to report on interim states is a force for long-term assignments. More generally, however, rotating agents can be valuable because it conceals information from agents, which mitigates incentive constraints. With complete contracts that communicate interim states, rotation allows for even more concealment possibilities and better-targeted incentives. Furthermore, it allows for the reporting of interim shocks at no cost to the principal. Properties of the production technology are also shown to matter. Substitutability of intertemporal effort is a force for long-term assignments, while coordination with Nash equilibrium strategies is a force for job rotation. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.