Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation
研究美国大公司中CEO互锁（两家公司CEO互相担任对方董事）对高管薪酬的影响，发现互锁CEO薪酬更高，但控制公司规模等因素后差距缩小；剔除商业关系导致的互锁后，薪酬溢价高达17%。
Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors?About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO-the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa.I investigate how these and other features of board composition affect CEO pay by using a sample of 9,804 director positions in America's largest companies.CEOs who lead interlocked firms earn significantly higher compensation.Also, interlocked CEOs tend to head larger firms.After controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, the pay gap is reduced dramatically.However, when firms that are interlocked due to documented business relationships are considered not interlocked, the measured return to interlock is as high as 17%.There also is evidence that the return to interlock was higher in the 1970s than in the early 1990s.