Corporate Misreporting and Bank Loan Contracting
首次研究财务重述对银行贷款合同的影响，发现重述后贷款利差更高、期限更短、更需担保且限制条款更多，欺诈性重述企业影响更大。
This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with the view that banks use tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.