Experienced vs. Described Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications?
通过个体实验，分别测量了描述型决策和经验型决策中的前景理论各成分（效用、损失厌恶、权重函数），发现两种情境下效用和损失厌恶无显著差异，但决策权重在收益领域存在显著不同。
This paper reports on the results of an experimental elicitation at the individual level of all prospect theory components (i.e., utility, loss aversion, and weighting functions) in two decision contexts: situations where alternatives are described as probability distributions and situations where the decision maker must experience unknown probability distributions through sampling before choice. For description-based decisions, our results are fully consistent with prospect theory's empirical findings under risk. Furthermore, no significant differences are detected across contexts as regards utility and loss aversion. Whereas decision weights exhibit similar qualitative properties across contexts typically found under prospect theory, our data suggest that, for gains at least, the subjective treatment of uncertainty in experience-based and description-based decisions is significantly different. More specifically, we observe a less pronounced overweighting of small probabilities and a more pronounced underweighting of moderate and high probabilities for experience-based decisions. On the contrary, for losses, no significant differences were observed in the evaluation of prospects across contexts. This paper was accepted by George Wu, decision analysis.