Agricultural Export Subsidies as a Tool of Trade Strategy: Before and after the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
分析农业出口补贴的主要理由，即减少政府赤字补贴成本，并探讨一国积极使用补贴能否迫使竞争对手减少补贴，通过纳什均衡和一致预期均衡检验，发现该论点缺乏支持。
Abstract If the main justification for agricultural export subsidies is that they reduce government costs of deficiency payments, then the 1996 farm legislation would make U.S. export subsidies largely unnecessary. An additional argument advanced in favor of export subsidies is that their aggressive use by one country will cause competing countries to reduce or discontinue their own subsidies. This argument is explored by means of a Nash equilibrium in which countries choose both a base subsidy level and a response to competitors, and by a consistent conjectures equilibrium. Little support is found for the argument.