On Competitive Price Adjustment for a Storable Good and Abstention from Trade
用信息的公共品属性解释交易总量低迷的时期，指出当市场出清价格的不确定性相对于获取信息的成本和推迟交易的成本较大时，交易可能被回避，即使存在双方都受益的交易机会。
The public good aspect of information is used to account for periods in which the aggregate level of trade is low. It is shown that abstention from trade may occur when the uncertainty with respect to the market-clearing price (there is no auctioneer) gets large relative to the cost of getting information about it and relative to the cost of postponing transactions. In this case, all agents are aware of bilateral Pareto-improving trading opportunities, but these opportunities are not exploited.